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This paper analyzes order placement strategies in a limit order market. Traders submitting market or limit
orders to the limit order book trade off the order price, the execution probability, and the winner’s curse risk
associated with different feasible order choices. Their optimal order strategy is characterized by a monotone
function which maps the liquidity demand of the investors into their subjective execution probabilities. We
provide conditions for the existence of a Markov perfect equilibria to the model whose outcomes satisfy a
mixing condition. The primitives of this model are the time varying shock that is common to all valuations,
as well as the probability distribution of private valuations, assumed to be a time invariant, independently
and identically distributed random variable. Using data from the Stockholm Stock Exchange, we compute
a semiparametric estimator of the primitives underlying the model, adapting previous work on linear index
models to time dependent data. The estimated order strategies are consistent with the theoretical trade-offs.
Speciﬁcation tests based on the monotonicity of the optimal order strategy ﬁnds little evidence against the
monotonicity restrictions. Overidentifying restrictions between equations are not rejected, and the coefﬁ-
cients on the linear factor structure are signiﬁcant with the predicted signs. However exclusion tests ﬁnd that
other variables related to the limit order book and market conditions predict order choices after accounting
for the trade-off between price, execution probability and winner’s curse. The observed order choices are
combined with estimates of the primitives to bound the potential and realized gains from trade in the market.
The current trading system leads traders to sometimes take the opposite side of the market to what the social
surplus maximizing outcome requires in order to capitalize on recent movements in the common shock,
and traders also willingly risk failure to execute trades by submitting limit orders too far from the bid ask
spread. About two thirds of these social losses, or transaction costs, are attributable to traders executing on
the wrong side of the market. We estimate that the current trading mechanism achieves at least 57 percent
of the potential gains from trade.1 Introduction
A fundamental issues in economics is how the trading process works in different market institutions, to
determine trading activity and market prices. For example, how does the trading process itself interact
with trader preferences to determine the volume of trade and the transactions prices in the market. In this
paper, we develop and empirically implement a model of optimal order placement in a particular ﬁnancial
market structure, a limit order market. We use data on traders’ order placement choices along with the
outcomes of these choices to estimate the trading opportunities in the market and the distribution of the
traders’ liquidity demand. The model imposes testable restrictions on the observed order strategies that we
use to develop speciﬁcation tests of the model. We estimate and test our model using data on order ﬂowfrom
the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Speciﬁcation tests are conducted to determine whether traders adjust their
trading strategies appropriately as the trading opportunity set changes. Our model provides information on
the distribution of liquidity demand in the market, enabling us to form estimates of the realized and potential
gains from trade in the market.
In a limit order market, buyers and sellers can submit an order of one of two types.1 A market order
executes immediately the most attractive price posted by previous limit orders. A limit order speciﬁes a
particular price for the order and speciﬁes a promise to trade at that price. The limit order book is a list of all
unexecuted limit orders. There is typically a trade-off between order price and execution probability which
is reﬂected as an implicit cost for immediacy or liquidity. A limit order involves a commitment to a price,
and so is generally exposed to unfavorable changes in the value of the asset. Unfavorable executions of the
limit order can arise when it is matched with a more informed trader’s market order or when the limit order
is ex–post mispriced, such as after a public announcement, and is then ‘picked off’ which we will refer to as
the winner’s curse. Overall then, the order placement problem involves trade-offs between price, execution
probability, and the winner’s curse.
These trade–offs form the basis of much of the theoretical literature on the choice between limit and
market orders.2 Our contribution is to estimate these trade–offs directly and test whether the observed order
1Domowitz (1993) documents that approximately 35 ﬁnancial markets in 16 different countries contain elements of limit order
mechanisms in their designs.
2Demsetz (1968) studied the equilibrium costs of immediacy in a model where buyers and sellers arrive at different times.
1placement decisions can be explained by the strategic trade–offs we consider. Furthermore, we use the
observed order choices made by the traders to make inferences about their demand for liquidity. Our model
is based upon a particular speciﬁcation of these trade–offs and weprovide empirical tests of this speciﬁcation
of traders’ objectives.
A feature of our empirical approach is that we do not explicitly solve for the equilibrium of the model in
terms of the underlying fundamentals. Instead we approach the inference problem indirectly, using the data
to make inferences about the trading opportunities and to empirically estimate the optimal order strategy,
for a given demand for immediacy. By combining the estimates of the optimal order strategy with the actual
choices made by the traders, we can infer properties of the distribution of traders’ valuations for the asset.
The theoretical model imposes a monotonicity restriction on the optimal order strategies which we test in our
data set. Similar approaches have been proposed by Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994), Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong (1999) and Laffont and Vuong (1996) to analyze auction data, and by Hotz and Miller
(1993) to estimate dynamic discrete choice models.
There has been previous empirical work studying limit orders. Using data on limit and market orders
from the Paris Bourse, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), ﬁnd evidence that traders provide liquidity by sub-
mitting limit orders, when liquidity is expensive, and consume liquidity, by submitting market orders, when
it is cheap to do so. Thus, in the Paris Bourse, traders follow order placement strategies that depend on the
trading opportunities offered by the limit order book.3 Our theoretical model imposes restrictions on the
relationship between the available liquidity in the market, expectations of future changes in the underlying
value of the asset, and the optimal order choices made by traders. We estimate and test these restrictions in
our data set.
In our empirical analysis, we use data on all orders submitted in one the the most actively traded stocks
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, Ericsson. Our empirical results are as follows. Both the trade–off
between order price and execution probability and the trade–off between order price and the winner’s curse
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981) and Kumar and Seppi (1993) theoretically analyze a trader’soptimal choice between
market and limit orders in different trading environments. Biais, Martimort and Rochet (1999), Foucault (1999), Glosten (1994),
O’Hara and Oldﬁeld (1986), Parlour (1998), Rock (1996), and Seppi (1997), theoretically analyze prices, trading volumes and
efﬁciency in ﬁnancial markets with limit order books.
3Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), and Handa and Schwartz (1996) analyze the proﬁtability of different order placement strategies
in different market conditions. Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (1997) estimate several econometric models of limit order execution
times. Sand˚ as (1999) estimates a structural model of competitive market making in a limit order market.
2are important in explaining variation in observed order placement decisions. However, we ﬁnd that these
terms representing the theoretical trade–off between price, execution probability and winner’s curse do not
explain all of the observed variation in order submissions. Weﬁnd little evidence against the monotonicity of
the estimated trading strategy. Weestimate that the current trading mechanism achieves at least 57 percent of
the maximal gains from trade. In our model, gains from trade are foregone when traders’ private incentives
lead to order placement strategies that do not implement the socially optimal outcomes. Losses either
occur when orders never execute, or when traders submit buy orders when they should submit sell orders to
implement the socially optimal outcome, and vice versa. Unexecuted orders account for approximately 12
percent of the estimated loss, while executed buy and sell orders account for the remainder of the estimated
loss.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a brief qualitative and quantitative descrip-
tion of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In section 3 we present our theoretical model, deriving its testable
restrictions, and showing how to theoretically calculate the potential and attained gains from trade in this
model. Section 4 contains a description of the estimation techniques that we apply and in section 5, we
apply these techniques to our dataset from the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The ﬁnal section concludes. All
proofs are contained in an appendix.
2 The Data
This section describes the market we study, the Stockholm Stock Exchange, and the chief characteristics of
our data set. In 1990 the Stockholm Stock Exchange completed the introduction of a computer based trading
system inspired by the systems at the Toronto and Paris Stock Exchanges. All order prices are required to be
multiples of a ﬁxed minimum price unit, commonly referred to as the tick size. When prices are below 100
Kronor, the tick size is 1/2 Kronor and when prices are above 100 Kronor, the tick size is 1 Kronor.4 The
order size is required to be a multiple of a round lot, where a round lot is 100 shares. Traders can also choose
to hide some fraction of the order quantity. Limit orders are stored in the centralized computer system and
automatically executed as they cross with incoming market orders. Limit orders are prioritized by price and
46.25 Kronor
￿ 1 US$ during the sample period.
3time of submission. At a given price all hidden orders have lower priority than the displayed orders.
All information on the status of the limit order book is instantaneously transmitted to the computer
screens in the ofﬁces of the exchange members. A member of the exchange trades both as an agent for
clients as a broker, and as a dealer on his own behalf. The market is very transparent, since the continuously
available information includes the ﬁve best bid and ask quote levels with the corresponding buy and sell
quantities. We reconstructed this information from the individual orders to create a data set that is very
similar to the one available to market participants. We could not, however, decompose the order quantity
into the hidden and the displayed components, only observing the sum of the two.
Our sample is representative of the electronic trading but does not cover all trading in stocks at the
Swedish Stock Exchange. Transactions made in London on the SEAQ International and in the U.S. on the
NASDAQ system account for a signiﬁcant fraction of the turnover in some ﬁrms. In addition, block trades
can be settled outside the electronic system and if this occurs during the normal trading hours these trades
must be reported to the market. Our focus is strictly on the order placement decision within the electronic
system.
The data set contains histories for all orders submitted to the electronic trading system during normal
trading hours for Ericsson A.B. at the Stockholm Stock Exchange.5 The sample period consists of the
59 trading days between December 3, 1991, and March 2, 1992. There are 22,128 orders to buy or sell
shares of Ericsson submitted during our sample period. Table 1 gives the average price, average daily
return and trading volume. The average price is 110.720 Kronor, and the tick size is 0.5 when the price
is below 100 Kronor and 1 Kronor when the price is above 100 Kronor. The average daily return for the
stock is 0.18%, and the stock had a 10.05% total return over the period we study. The standard deviation,
maximum and minimum returns indicate that the stock returns have been reasonably volatile during this
period. Thus, limit orders submitted over this period can be subject large adverse price changes. The
average daily trading volume is 74.43 million Kronor. The 1991 annual report from the Stockholm Stock
Exchange (1991 Stockholms Fondb¨ ors ˚ Arsrapport) reports that over 1991, the turnover rate of the stock was
38%, so that there is a relatively large volume of trade in Ericsson during our sample period.
5Ericsson is traded continuously from 10:00 am to 2:30 pm.
4Table 2 provides sample statistics on the order ﬂow. The ﬁrst row presents the number of market and
limit orders submitted. For both the buy and sell sides most of the orders submitted are market orders.
There are more buy than sell orders in our sample. The second line of the table gives information on the
size of the orders submitted. The average size of a buy order is smaller than the size of a sell order both for
market and limit orders, roughly offsetting the larger number of buy orders submitted. The third line of the
table reports estimates of the unconditional probability of execution for different limit orders. The execution
probability for market orders is by deﬁnition equal to one. The probabilities clearly show the average
trade–off between execution probability and the order price, since the execution probability for limit orders
drops monotonically the more favorable the submitted price is. The ﬁnal row of the table gives estimates
of the average time–to–execution for limit orders. These sample averages suggest that, conditioning on
execution, more aggressively priced limit orders take longer to execute than less aggressively priced limit
orders. Noting again the stochastic movement in trading prices, the average time–to–execution suggests that
aggressively priced limit orders are more exposed to changes in the underlying value of the asset.
Once a limit order is submitted, it enters the limit order book. Table 3 contains information on the limit
order book over our sample period. The ﬁrst three columns give information on the size of the order queue
at the ﬁrst 3 buy and sell price quotes. The average market order size is roughly 2200 shares, so typically
the quantities at the best quotes equal about 9 incoming orders. The median quantity in the order book is
is less than the average quantity, indicating skewness in the distribution of the queue lengths. The standard
deviations indicate that the size of the order book is reasonably volatile. We also report information on the
price quotes in the fourth through ﬁnal columns of the table. Typically the three best prices quotes on the
buy and sell sides are spaced one tick apart.
Our model analyzes how the trade–offs involved in limit order submissions drive the decisions of traders.
Table 4 provides further motivation for the analysis. In it, we report how various conditioning variables
affect the trade–off between limit order price and execution probability. The conditioning variables are
coded as Low if they are below their median values and High if they are above. The variables were chosen
to characterize the limit order book, market conditions, and the size of the order. To capture variation
in the limit order book, we used the number of shares at the two best bid and ask quotes, and the bid–
ask spread, which equals the ask price minus bid price. Most estimates imply a trade–off between price
5and execution probabilities for the conditioning set under consideration. An exception to this statistical
regularity appears on the sell side of the book when the bid-ask spread is below the median. For each
limit order and conditioning variable, we report a chi-squared test of the hypothesis that the conditional
execution probabilities are independent of the conditioning information. The hypothesis that the execution
probabilities are constant across the conditioning information is typically rejected. For example, we ﬁnd that
the execution probabilities for limit sell orders decline as quantity at the best quote decreases. Overall, the
results in this table provide evidence that the price and execution probability trade–off exhibits systematic
variation.
One might anticipate that changing the trade–off between price and execution probabilities would be
reﬂected in traders’ order submission strategies. Table 5 provides estimates of the conditional probability
of submitting different types of orders, conditional on the information sets described above. We calculated
chi–squared test of the hypothesis that the choice probabilities are constant across different information
sets. The chi–squared tests all reject the null hypothesis. Thus, traders make different decisions in different
market conditions. For example, increasing the size of the limit order queue at the best ask quotes decreases
the likelihood of sell limit order submissions and increases the likelihood of market sell orders. Similar
results hold at the buy side.
3 A Model
This section presents and analyzes the theoretical model we apply to our data set. First, we provide as-
sumptions on the trading environment, trader preferences, and the information available to the trader. Then
we characterize the optimal trading strategy for an individual trader in this environment. We show that the
optimal strategy has an important monotonicity property: Traders with higher valuations submit buy orders
with higher execution probabilities and traders with lower valuations submit sell orders with higher execu-
tion probabilities. The latter parts of this section establish the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium
satisfying a uniform mixing condition and discusses its welfare properties.
63.1 Trading Rules
Agents arrive sequentially in the market with an opportunity to trade. Agents can place an order to buy or



















￿ represent the cardinality of the set of orders. The difference between two consecutive prices is at
least d
￿ 0, referred to as the tick size.
We use the notation t to refer both to the time period t when the order is submitted and to the agent whose













￿ . Upon entering into the market, the trader decides
if he would like to trade a unit of the asset, and if so, whether to buy or sell the asset and at what price. We























1 means that the trader submits a sell order at price pi, di
￿
￿ 1 is a buy order at price pi, and
di
￿ 0 is no order submitted at price pi. The constraint that the order size be restricted to one unit is given
by did j
￿ 0, for all i
￿ j
￿
￿ i. We let dt
￿ D refer to the decision made by the agent at time t.
Once an order has been submitted, it either may trade immediately, or it may enter the queue of unﬁlled
orders, referred to as the limit order book. Upon entry into the limit order book, one of two things eventually
occur. The order may be executed, or it may be canceled. At any period t, the limit order book consists of
outstanding orders to buy and sell stock at speciﬁed prices. Let hit denote the number of limit orders at price
pi at the beginning of period t, where hit
￿ 0 indicates the number of outstanding buy orders at price i and
hit
















￿ P : hjt
￿ 0
￿ if hkt
￿ 0 for some k
￿
¥ if hkt
￿ 0 for all k
￿







￿ P : hjt
￿ 0
￿ if hkt
￿ 0 for some k
￿
0 if hkt
￿ 0 for all k
￿
The trading rules imply that at
￿ bt, and we refer to at
￿
bt as the bid–ask spread.
7If the agent places a buy order at a price which is at least as high as the ask price, that is dit
￿ 1 for some
pi
￿ at
￿ then the order is immediately ﬁlled by the oldest outstanding limit order at the ask price at. This is
called a market buy order. If the agent submits a buy order less than the ask price, meaning dit
￿ 1 for some
pi
￿ at
￿ the order is called a limit buy order, and added to the queue for existing orders at that price, hit
￿
These rules imply that in the limit order book, orders are ﬁrst prioritized by price and then by submission
time. The rules for a sell order are symmetric.
We assume the processes governing the arrival of new orders and the cancellation of outstanding limit
orders are exogenous. One order arrives per period, where the period is not necessarily of ﬁxed length, and
existing limit orders are canceled each period with some exogenous probability.
3.2 Preferences and Information
Thetth agent’s valuation for the stock isdenoted by vt. Ourmodel decomposes vt into a common component,
denoted yt






￿ the idiosyncratic portion of the tth agent’s valuation remains constant over time, and is














￿ The private component of the valuation ut can be interpreted as agent t’s
preference for liquidity; it captures his willingness to hold the stock. The common shock yt is a stochastic
process, whose realizations are observed by all traders. Since each transaction involves a market order
executing a limit order, the trader placing the market order is acting on better information about the common
shock than the agent who had previously submitted the limit order. Thus, agents have two motivations for
trade: First is the difference in private valuations across agents, and second is the change in the common
value of the asset over time.






￿ W. The exogenous variables in our model are all deﬁned on this probability space, and we let












￿ , and dt
￿ dt
￿ w
￿ are all Ft measurable functions. Let At
# Ft,
8denote thetth trader’s information set when making her trading decision. Clearly the trader’s decision, dt
￿ w
￿
is At measurable, and we also assume that ht
￿ w
￿ is At measurable. We drop the w and Ft and At notation to
reduce notational burden where no confusion results.
Once an order is submitted to the limit order book, it will either be canceled or executed against an
incoming market order. Let te
i denote the time at which an order submitted at time t and at price i is executed
conditional on not being previously canceled and let tw
i be the cancellation time of the order. Deﬁne lis as
the Fs measurable conditional probability that a limit order at price i in the book at time s is canceled at
time s




￿ We deﬁne the indicator variable for



















This indicator variable is measurable with respect to Ft
















Animportant building block for both the model and the empirical work which follows are the conditional
execution probabilities for buy and sell orders at each price pi















































￿ at then the buy order is executed immediately, so yb
it
￿ 1. The rules governing trade imply that
for a buy order less than the ask, pi




hold for the sell side at the bid and higher.




yt. If an order at price pi is placed at t and
















Summing over all possible future execution times t
￿ t and price choices, and integrating with respect to
the random execution and cancellation times and conditioning with respect to the trader’s information set,




























Assuming agents are risk neutral, dt







￿ indicate the direction of the order submitted. Then, the trader’s objective function, Equation



































































it deﬁned similarly for the sell side. The expectations in Equations (3) through (5) are taken over the
random execution time, and the associated random changes in the common value. It is in the calculation
of these expectations that this order submission problem accounts for the multiperiod nature of the agent’s
problem. The ﬁrst term in Equation (4) gives the probability of execution times the expected payoff from a
sure execution at that price. This term captures the agent’s trade-off between execution price and execution
probability. The second term in Equation (4) measures the expected changes in the common value from time
of submission until execution of the order. Thus, the second term captures the effects of receiving execution
when the common value moves, and we refer to this as the winner’s curse risk.
Let do
t
￿ D maximize the expected payoff of the trader, Equation (3). The next proposition establishes
two facts. It shows that based on their valuations, agents can be split into buyers, sellers, and agents who do
not submit orders, and that the optimal orders are related monotonically to valuations through their execution
probabilities.




1 for some pi and let ys
it denote the associated execution probability. If the
tth agent’s valuation was u












￿ If the tth trader’s valuation was u rather than ut and u
￿ ut
￿ then he would set
do
jt





10Because the tick size is larger than zero, the choice variable dt is discrete. Consequently sellers with sim-
ilar, but non-identical, private valuations optimally submit the same order in similar circumstances. Proposi-
tion 1 implies that the set of valuations can be partitioned into intervals in which all agents whose valuations







￿ , the valuation of an agent who is indifferent between submitting an order to sell a


































































In principle, the choice problem can be solved in three steps. For each u, solve for the optimal buy order
and sell order respectively, and calculate the expected payoffs associated with the optimal buy and sell order.
The compare the maximum of the two associated expected values with zero, the expected payoffs obtained
by not submitting any order. Accordingly, deﬁneV s
t
￿ u





























































































￿ the agent should submit the limit buy order at the price which solves Equation
(8). The proof of the next proposition exploits the properties of these valuation functions in extending the
11monotonicity result to cover the choice of whether to submit a buy order, a sell order, or not submit any
order.
Proposition 2 For each t






































￿ there exists an open interval
￿ ut
￿ ut




























All that remains to complete the characterization is to explain how the subproblems embodied in Equa-
tions (7) and (8) are solved. The basic idea is to discard prices that the tth agent would never pick, regardless
of the private value ut




















































Then clearly no trader would set djt
￿ 1 because pj is dominated by the price pair pi and pk
￿ Dominated























Thus, the procedure is to form indifference valuations for price pairs, and iteratively drop any price p j







a process of elimination we are led to the set of prices that an agent might conceivably ﬁnd optimal, either as
a buyer or as a seller. Denoting by Pb
t and Ps
t the two price sequences remaining in the choice set for buyers
and sellers upon iteratively deleting the dominated prices, we are led to the following characterization of the
optimal rule.
Proposition 3 For each t there are two sets of undominated prices, Pb
t and Ps
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￿ Pb
t , while if vt
















￿ 1 for some pi
￿ Pb
t , if ut












































￿ . A similar result holds on the
buy side.
Proposition 3 fully characterizes the mapping from private valuations to execution probabilities, but
only partially characterizes the mapping from private valuations to prices. It implies that, conditioning on
the same information aside from the private valuation ut, traders with the highest private valuation submit
market buy orders, those with the lowest submit market sell orders, while the agents who stay out of the
market have higher valuations than limit order sellers but lower valuations than limit order buyers. More
generally, monotonicity between prices and valuations is assured if the execution probabilities for buy orders
are monotonically increasing in prices, and the execution probabilities for sell orders are monotonically
decreasing in prices. These conditions are satisﬁed if the winner’s curse does not increase the closer a limit
order is placed to the bid–ask spread.







￿ If pi and pj belong to Pb
t , then pi
￿ pj
￿ If pi and pj belong
to Ps
t , then pi
￿ pj
￿
That the winner’s curse is worse for low probability speculative orders than for high probability orders
close to the spread is an intuitively appealing notion, but difﬁcult to derive from conditions on the exogenous
variables, such as the stochastic process governing the common shock. There is, however, one noteworthy
special case. If there are no common shocks to the system, then the execution probabilities to buy (sell) are
monotone increasing (decreasing) in price. Consequently order prices are monotone increasing in private
valuations in this special case.
133.4 Equilibrium
Our data set contains no information about the real costs of market participation, nor about agents who turn
down opportunities to place orders. Rather than speculate about either of these considerations, our empirical
work focuses on markets where participation is universal. We now provide a condition that guarantees that
all traders, irrespective of their private valuations submit an order. The condition that yt is bounded limits
the maximum possible loss from the winner’s curse, and therefore serves a dual purpose in our analysis.
First it directly implies that universal participation is optimal. Second, the bound is used to establish the
existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium, as deﬁned in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).

















The preceding is robust to how agents form their subjective expectations over the future, but our em-
pirical work assumes that agents hold rational expectations. To help motivate this assumption, we provide
conditions that guarantee the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium. Let the common value, yt be deter-











￿ and we retain the assumption that yt is bounded, by bounding the support of zt. We also assume
there is a strictly positive probability that any outstanding limit order will be canceled each period and
that tw
i , the cancellation time for the tth order is independently distributed across time, but depends on the









￿ is generated by the factors, the











properties. First, the subjective beliefs that traders have about the probability of execution and cancellation





rational for these beliefs.
14Proposition 6 If Equation (9) holds then a Markov perfect equilibrium to the model exists.
The Markov property of this equilibrium is not, however, sufﬁciently strong for our data analysis. So, for
the sake of the empirical analysis that follows, we impose two assumptions on the probability distribution
functions in the model. Loosely speaking, these conditions bound the impact of events with small but strictly
positive probabilities on decision making. The ﬁrst assumption makes it unlikely that an unusual state of the
book will endure, by assuming the probability of cancellations increases to one, as the size of the limit order
book grows without bound. The other one places an analogous restriction on zt, to prevent it from becoming
stuck in a region of low probability for very long. These conditions ensure that the sequential equilibrium
generates outcomes that follow a Markov process satisfying a uniform mixing condition. LetM b
a denote the
















































? denote the number of orders in ht at time t























￿ Then the outcomes generated by the Markov perfect equilibrium are uniformly
mixing, with uniform mixing coefﬁcients converging to zero at a geometric rate.
This uniform mixing condition is used to later to establish that our estimators are consistent and asymptoti-
cally normal.
3.5 Welfare Properties
The efﬁciency a limit order market can be evaluated and compared with alternative arrangements for con-
ducting trade. One benchmark is the theoretical maximum social surplus, deﬁned as the expected gains from
trade, where expectations are taken over the distribution for private valuations, G
￿ u












￿ the median private
valuation. To achieve the maximum social surplus, limit orders would be indexed to the common value.






￿ to meet existing limit sell and buy orders, or alternatively place a limit buy or sell order.





￿ . Under our assumptions on traders
preferences and that the common value is known to all traders, a Pareto efﬁcient allocation is achieved. Here
traders with private valuations above the median of the private valuation distribution purchase a share and
those below the median sell a share. Each order is executed at the surplus maximizing price, equal to the































































































￿ is the sign function.
The maximum social surplus can be compared to the surplus under current the trading system. The
current trading rules subject the traders to two potential sources of loss. First, to achieve the maximal social
surplus, all agents eventually transact, while under the current mechanism, some traders’ orders may not
execute. The order may not execute either because the order may be canceled or the common value may
move so far away from the order that the likelihood of a market order trading against the order goes to zero.
Second, some agents may ﬁnd it privately optimal to buy a unit of stock when they should sell to achieve
the maximal social surplus, and vice versa.
We now derive the foregone surplus in the current market structure relative to the Pareto optimal allo-

















￿ 1 if the buy order submitted by the tth trader ever executes, ct
￿
￿
1 if the sell order ever executes
and ct
￿ 0 if the tth trader’s order never executes.













￿ If the order does not
16execute, then te



























denotes a transfer between buyer and seller, and so integrating over the population of traders its expected
































The second source of loss occurs when an agent with private value less than the median of the private
valuations buys the stock and vice versa for agents with private value above the median. The surplus fore-
gone by a trader with a valuation below the median who eventually purchases the share is given by 2ut, with
a similar expression for those traders who should be purchasing to achieve the maximum social surplus, but
































The ﬁrst two indicator functions in Equation (15) pick out those traders who sell a share in the current
trading system but should purchase a share to achieve the optimal surplus, and the second set of indicator
functions pick out buyers who should be selling.
4 Econometrics Implementation
This section shows how we estimate our theoretical model and test its empirical restrictions. In the Markov






be the state vector. Proposition 3 shows that at every equilibrium information set, wt there are two ﬁnite,







￿ from which traders choose an
order price, with generic element pk
j
￿ wt
￿ . We let qk
j
￿ wt
￿ denote the indifference valuation associated with












The key identifying assumption in our framework is that we can determine the limit orders with the
highest execution probability. Our estimation strategy requires either the highest execution probability for
a limit sell order always corresponds to the price tick one above the bid price, and/or the highest execu-
tion probability for a limit order to sell invariably corresponds to the price tick below the ask price. This
identiﬁcation condition is nested within the following null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 For each wt










￿ and and pj denote the
















































































The identiﬁcation condition essentially requires that the conditions of Proposition 4 hold in our data for
the limit orders close to the spread. Tables 2 and 4 lend empirical support for the identifying assumption,
because the estimates clearly exhibit the required monotonicity properties within two ticks of the spread.
However those statistics are not conclusive, if only because they fail to fully account for all the information
available to agents across conditioning sets, but may smooth over potential violations to the monotonicity
requirement. For a computational standpoint, the virtue of the identiﬁcation condition is that it effectively
partitions all valuations by quantities that can be consistently estimated, thus facilitating the implementation
of our semiparametric estimation and testing strategy.
Our estimation strategy is based on the relationship between the the probability distribution for private
valuations, the observed choices of traders, and the indifference valuations which empirically link the two.
The conditional probability that a trader chooses a sell order price less than ps
j
￿ wt
























































￿ . The right hand side of the ﬁrst line follows from the monotonicity of the threshold valuations
and the second line follows from our assumption that the private valuation are drawn identically and inde-
pendently drawn from G
￿ u
￿ . Similarly, the conditional probability that a trader either submits a sell order or
a buy order at a price less than or equal to pb
j
￿ wt























































where a0 is an L dimensional vector of unknown coefﬁcients. This linear factor structure assumption allows
us to put Equations (16) and (17) in the form of a linear index models, which we estimate using semipara-
metric methods.




















































Let xjkt be an L



























































































































































Therefore thelinear factor structure together withourfocus onMarkov perfect equilibria implies that choices



































with a similar expression on the buy side.
The estimation and testing of our model divides into three parts. In the ﬁrst part, we form nonparametric








extensively on Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989), Robinson (1989) and Ahn (1997), we then use these
estimates to form approximations of xjkt
￿ which along with the observed choices made by the traders, dt
￿
yields an average derivative estimator of b0
￿ The second part of the empirical work tests two features of




the monotonicity conditions of Proposition 3, applying the results derived by Wolak (1989), (1991). Our
model also implies that the conditional choice probabilities depend only on x jkt. We test this by adding in
other variables to the index model and perform tests of the hypothesis that these variables are unimportant in
predicting traders’ order choices. The third part of our empirical work estimates bounds on the the welfare
gains and losses to traders in the current trading environment. Using our consistent estimators of x
Wjktb0
￿
we obtain consistent estimates for some functions that bound G
￿ u
￿ from both sides. These estimates are
used to to derive bounds for the measures described in Section 3 that evaluate the efﬁciency of this market
mechanism. Appendix Bformally justiﬁes our empirical approach, by establishing the asymptotic properties
of our estimators and test statistics.
204.1 Semiparametric Estimation
The execution probabilities and winner’s curse terms necessary to form the components of x jkt are estimated






￿ by ˆ yk
i
￿ wt























































￿ denote the unconditional density of xjkt and let z
￿ wt
￿ denote a trimming indicator which is






















￿ For any limit sell price j ticks above the bid, we deﬁne the weighted probability that the




















































See Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989) for example. In the second step we use the ˆ x jkt approximations to











￿ with respect to




































Similar estimators can be formed for the buy side, as well.
Noting that the ﬁrst component in the vector f jk is kjk
￿ an estimator of a0 is obtained by dividing all the
components of ˆ fjk by the ﬁrst component, and then picking the last L components. Our theoretical model
allows us to identify a0 since the theoretical model implies that the ﬁrst component of b0 is equal to one.
21Implementation of Equation (25) can be repeated I times, for different price choices relative to the bid
and ask, and in the case of any price lying on or between the spread, for both buyers and sellers. This
observation motivates the third step in estimation, which combines the estimates obtained in the second step
to improve asymptotic efﬁciency. Accordingly, let ˆ f denote a I dimensional vector formed from I different
￿ j
￿ k
￿ combinations of ˆ fjk, let a denote the I dimensional vector of the scaling factors for the I choices and



















































for any is a positive deﬁnite I dimensional weighting matrix, C
The asymptotic properties of ˆ f are established in appendix B, while the properties of the minimum
distance estimator are discussed in Chamberlain (1984). Providing the ancillary assumptions made in the











￿ converge to normal
distributions with mean zero and covariances given in the appendix. In the case when a consistent estimator





J is substituted for C, the minimized value of the objective function







L degrees of freedom under the null
hypothesis that the model is correctly speciﬁed.
4.2 Asymptotic Tests
With regards to testing, suppose further that at least one of the two following conditions are satisﬁed. The
ﬁrst condition is that k
￿ b and l
￿ s; the second one is that k


































































22for any vector valued At measurable mapping qt
￿ Since such inequalities are not imposed in estimation, they
can be tested using the estimated parameters of the model. The aim is to investigate whether positive state
variables known at the time of order submission are correlated with violations of monotonicity by forming
test statistics based on m
q
ijkl
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Wmd
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* converges in distribution to a normal
random variable with mean zero and covariance matrix S. Since x









￿ which are the underlying parameters of our model, undertaking a global test of inequality (27)



























Under the null hypothesis that inequality (27) holds, Wolak (1989) shows that M
q
ijkl is distributed as the
























































* is a weight, which can be calculated using Monte Carlo meth-
ods.
4.3 Welfare Bounds
Because traders with similar, but non-identical, valuations submit the same order when faced with the same
set of state variables, the individual private valuations are unidentiﬁed. Therefore obtaining estimators of
the welfare measures and other indicators of market structure, hinges on being able to directly integrate or
simulate an approximation to G
￿ u
￿ . From Equation (23), a point on G
￿ u




Wjktb0 is implied by some wt reached in equilibrium. This follows since x
Wjktb0 is consistently es-
timated by ˆ xjkt
W ˆ bmd































￿ We can use the index evaluated at buy prices in a
23similar way. Although the support of G is not necessarily covered by the range of the index function x jkt
W b0
￿
consistent estimates of upper and lower bounds to the welfare measures described earlier can be obtained.
The terms in Equations (14) and (15) can be bounded using the appropriate Riemann sums, taken at
points where G
￿ u
￿ is identiﬁed. Let G1
￿ u
￿ be the probability distribution function formed from the lower
Riemann sums, and G2
￿ u
￿ the probability distribution function formed from the upper Riemann sums. These




















￿ have the same discontinuity points, which occur on the boundaries of open intervals that are









￿ in open neighborhoods covered by










$ 1ktb0 the threshold values
containing ut
￿ where pj is the price associated with the tth order. Applying the law of iterated expectations


































































































































Together these inequalities form the basis for the upper bounds we constructed. Making the appropriate




























































24Upon setting ˆ u1t
￿ ˆ x
kjkt ˆ b
￿ and ˆ u2t
￿ ˆ x
kj





































































￿ and ˆ G2
￿ u





￿ We obtained a consistent estimator
of a lower bound for Equation (14) in a similar manner.
We used a similar method to bound the welfare losses arising from sellers who should purchase to
maximize social surplus. For each sell order submitted at price p j, the model implies ut
￿ x
kjstb0. From


































































































































































The bounds for buyers who should sell to achieve the maximal gains from trade are computed in a similar
manner.
Substituting consistent estimates for
￿ u1t
￿ u2t
￿ for each limit order in the data, a consistent estimate of





￿ evaluated at the appropriate points then yields a consistent estimator of a














































































































25with an upper bound computed in a similar manner.
It only remains to bound the total available social surplus. The law of iterated expectations implies that

























Since neither uh nor ul are identiﬁed, G2
￿ u
￿ is unidentiﬁed in neighborhoods near uh and G1
￿ u
￿ is uniden-
tiﬁed around u1. Therefore, we cannot identify an upper bound to Expression (36) in terms of consistently

































































































where the estimated quantities in Equation (38) are deﬁned above.
5 Empirical Results
Thissection reports parameter estimates forthe index modeland tests ofvarious over–identifying restrictions
of the model. We provide estimates of the private valuation distributions and of the realized and potential
gains from trade. Details about the implementation of the nonparametric estimators are found in Appendix
C.
In our theoretical model, the conditional execution probability and winner’s curse functions depend on
the current limit order book and the state variable that are useful in predicting changes in the common value
of the asset. As explained in the previous sections, the model leaves considerable latitude in the speciﬁcation
of the state variables. The following list of variables emerged from a preliminary analysis to determine the
main factors effecting the execution probabilities and represents the state variables we used in our empirical
speciﬁcation:
￿
Time elapsed since the last order was submitted to the market. This variable is a measure of competi-
tion in the supply and demand for liquidity.
26￿
Time elapsed from market open. The variable captures intra-day effects in trading opportunities.
￿
The current bid–ask spread. This captures variations in trading opportunities and the competition in
the book. This is quoted as a percentage of the average of the bid and ask prices, or the mid–quote.
￿
The total quantities at the best bid quote. This variable is a measure of the quantity of orders on the
buy side of the market.
￿
The total quantities at the best ask quote. This variable is a measure of the quantity of orders on the
sell side of the market.
￿
The current mid-quote. This is the average of the current bid and ask quotes in the limit order book.
￿
The current level of the OMX market index. This is a value weighted average of the prices of the 30
most actively traded stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.
We experimented with several factors that might affect the common value of Ericsson, including the
Kronor-US dollar exchange rate and the short term interest rate, but found that only the OMX market index,
sampled every minute had a signiﬁcant affect. For this reason our empirical results below are based on the
assumption that the common value of Ericsson is proportional to the OMX market index.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 6 reports estimates obtained by applying Equation (25) to four different order
choices, using the above variables to compute the nonparametric estimates of conditional expectations that
enter into xjkt. Each row refers to estimates using different order choices. The orders that we use are the
limit sell order 1 tick above the market sell order, the limit sell order 2 ticks above the market sell order,
the limit buy order 1 tick below the market buy order and the market buy order. The table reports the
point estimates, asymptotic standard errors and asymptotic t–statistics of the scaling factor in Equation (24)
and the coefﬁcient on the market factor, b times the scaling factor. From Equation (24), the scale factor
is an estimate of the expectation of the density of x jkt times the density of the private value distribution
evaluated at the threshold valuation. This explains the order of magnitude of these estimates. In addition,
the scale factor is different for each choice equation used, so that the scale factor associated with different
choices in Table 6 are estimates of different quantities. The asymptotic standard errors in Table 6 indicate
that both the scale factor and the coefﬁcient on the market index are relatively precisely estimated for the
27choices involving market buy or sell orders. However, for the other 2 choice equations that we consider, our
estimates are less precise.
The second panel of Table 6 reports estimates obtained by applying the minimum distance estimator,
Equation (26) to our model. We report the scaling coefﬁcient for our four choice equations and the overall
coefﬁcient estimate for the market factor, plus the associated standard errors and t–statistics. We also report
the minimized value of the objective function for the estimator, Equation (26), along with the associated
asymptotic p–value. The coefﬁcient on the market is estimated relatively precisely, with a point estimate of
0.378. The chi-squared statistic indicates that we cannot reject our model with this test statistic.
Together the stochastic process driving the common shock and the distribution of private valuations
comprise the primitives of our model. Accordingly, Figure 1 plots the estimated common value against
the midquote over the sample, while Figures 2 and 3 present nonparametric estimates of the probability
distribution for private valuations at the points where it is identiﬁed. The vertical lines in Figure 1 separate
the sample into 6 consecutive subsamples of roughly 2 weeks in length. Comparing the two series, we see
they behave in a similar manner at low frequencies, but that at higher frequencies, there are some noticeable
deviations. In our model deviations between the midquote and the common shock arise because the limit
order book depends on lagged values of the common shock through limit orders placed in the past, and
consequently the model would predict that the midquote series has a tendency to lag the common shock. For
the most part this prediction is borne out in practice, providing some conﬁrmation that the series estimating
the common value is a reasonable approximation.





￿ the nonparametric regression of the cumulative choices at points where it
isidentiﬁed, namely atthe thresholds estimated by ˆ x
Wjkt ˆ bM
￿ using anormal kernel withasmoothing parameter
of 3. As we remarked earlier, G
￿ u
￿ is not identiﬁed over its entire support, and we did not estimate the
bottom two deciles nor the top decile of the distribution. An alternative to our semiparametric estimation
strategy would have been to impose a functional form on the probability distribution determining private
valuations. Our estimate of G
￿ u
￿ suggests that many inﬂection points would be missed by specifying G
￿ u
￿
parametrically. Nevertheless the apparent decline in G
￿ u
￿ between private values of -30 and -20 Kronor is
diagnostic evidence that the model does not explain all the observed variation in choice probabilities.
28We investigated this anomaly by estimating the private valuation probability distribution with data from
each of the subsamples taken separately, that is given ˆ x jkt and ˆ bM. The results, displayed in Figure 3, are
noteworthy for two reasons. The second subsample contains the most egregious violation of monotonicity,
and this corresponds to the second subsample in Figure 1, where differences between the midquote and
the estimated common value are most pronounced. These results might indicate factors have been omitted
in our speciﬁcation of the common shock, and/or that the probability distribution for private valuations is
not independent and identically distributed over time. The second noteworthy feature about Figure 3 is
that the subsamples seem to capture different segments of the support for G
￿ u
￿
￿ Because the indifference
valuations vary with the relation between the book and the common shock, it might not seem surprising that
subsamples characterized by different sets of state variables reveal information about different parts of the
G
￿ u
￿ distribution. This second feature, therefore, might merely reﬂect sample size problems encountered
by partitioning the data too ﬁnely, although it could also be interpreted as evidence of nonstationarity in the
common shock process itself.
The results form the formal speciﬁcation tests we undertook, presented in Tables 7 through 9, comple-
ment the diagnostic checks displayed in Figures 1 through 3. Table 7 presents the monotonicity test of the
threshold valuations. Each row reports a one–sided t–statistic for the null hypothesis that m
q
ijkl
￿ 0, and the
overall monotonicity test, Equation (29) using various conditioning instruments. The ﬁrst row simply takes
the constant as the instrument. The next rows report on instruments that account for characteristics of the
order chosen; the distance between the order price and the mid-quote and the number of shares in the order.
We then experimented with instruments that capture the overall market conditions: slow trading and fast
trading both measure the time–between–orders, an indicator variable for when the tick size
￿ 1 Kronor, the
bid–ask spread, the absolute price change over the last 30 minutes and the trading volume over the last 30
minutes. Other instruments tried to capture the state of the order book when the order is submitted. The ﬁnal
row of the table reports the test performed jointly across all the state variables. The asymptotic p–values in
this table never reject the monotonicity of the threshold valuations.
Our model implies that the cumulative probability of order choices depends on information set according





































































































jk, for all choices. Table 8
reports estimates from applying the average derivative estimator to Equation (39) along with asymptotic chi-






jk for each equation, and also jointly across the entire
system. For the choice equations involving market orders, the estimated coefﬁcients for both the shading
term and the winner’s curse term are statistically signiﬁcant, with signs consistent with the theoretical model.
Traders do consider the trade–off between price and execution probability and winner’s curse in choosing
between market and limit orders, although the decisions involving the choice between 2 limit orders, Limit
sell +2 ticks and limit buy 1 tick the coefﬁcients on the trade–off terms are not statistically signiﬁcant. The
chi-squared tests of the restrictions of the model reject the restrictions for all choice equations except for the
choice between limit sells at one and 2 ticks, and jointly across all equations.





































with the average derivative estimator for each choice. Here, the scalar wit is in the information set of
the trader when the order is submitted. Equation (22) implies the restriction that W i
jk
￿ 0 for all choices.
Table 9 provides estimates of Equation (40) using all of the variables wit used in computing the execution
probabilities and winner’s curse terms in x jkt.6 These models are estimated including only one extra variable
at a time to keep the dimension of the variables in the average derivate estimator manageable. For each
choice equation, we computed a chi–squared test of the joint hypothesis that the variables in x jkt are equal
to zero. Typically, we reject this hypothesis; the trade–off is important in predicting order choices. We
6Variables that were not used in estimating the xjkt may be important in Equation (40) through correlation with the true execution
probabilities or winner’s curse terms.
30also computed t–statistics and joint chi–squared statistics of the hypothesis that the extra variables have
coefﬁcients equal to zero. The null hypothesis is rejected for all extra variables and choice equations. Panel
B of Table 9 contains the results of adding the bid–quantity and ask–quantity on the order book as additional
factors. The point estimates for the bid–quantity are negative for all choice equations. These results suggest
that when the order book is thick on the buy side, traders increase the likelihood of submitting aggressive
sell orders, and reduce the likelihood of submitting aggressive buy orders. The reverse holds when the order
book is thick on the sell side. These results suggest that the theoretical trade-off does not capture all of the
effects of competition in the order book.
Overall the empirical results in Tables 6 through 9 and Figures 1 through 3 are moderately supportive
of the underlying model. The coefﬁcient on the factor structure is positive and signiﬁcant, and the common
shock generated by the single factor structure leads the midquote series, as predicted by the theory. The
winner’s curse and execution probability terms have signiﬁcant qualitative effects as predicted by the model.
Neither the overidentifying restrictions between the index equations marking off different choices, nor the
monotonicity restrictions between valuations and prices applied in estimation, can berejected. The empirical
results also reveal deﬁciencies in the model, at least in the specialization we estimate, where auxiliary
assumptions guarantee that every trading opportunity produces a limit or a market order. Although the
estimated distribution function is monotonically increasing throughout most of its range, there are some
glaring exceptions. Also, some of the constraints restricting the way the state variables in the model should
enter within equations are systematically rejected. Thus the estimates of the welfare bounds we present
below should be treated with caution, as a tentative benchmark.
Table 10 presents our estimates of the bounds on the realized and potential gains from trade in our data.
These estimates are formed by numerically integrating the welfare measures in Equations (33), (35) and (38)
using estimates of the distribution of private valuations.7 The unit of account is the Swedish Kronor, and
the average price of a share of Ericsson is approximately 110 Kronor in our sample. At almost 22 Kronors,
the expected social surplus from each order is at least 15 percent of the average closing price, implying the
social surplus from optimally allocating the shares throughout the trading population is expected to yield at
7In the numerical integration, we forced our estimate of the density of the private valuation distribution to be positive by replac-








￿ , where e
￿ 0
￿ 0005. The numerical results are insensitive to the choice of e in these computations.
31least 44 Kronors, or 30 percent of the average price.
As explained in Section 4, an upper bound on the social surplus was not estimated, because our empirical
strategy does not identify the surplus of those who have the most to gain, namely traders with valuations
above the median placing market buy orders, and traders with valuations below the median placing market
sell orders. This point should be stressed when contrasting the current mechanism with the losses from
prohibiting trade altogether, but can be ignored when the comparison is between mechanisms that permit
all individuals with extreme valuations to trade. Our ﬁnding, that there are substantial gains from optimally
allocating this ﬁnancial asset amongst traders, is all the more noteworthy because both buyers and sellers
value the asset for its dividend stream and prospective capital gains. In our model this characteristic is
captured by the stochastic component common across valuations, which has a signiﬁcant empirical affect.
Given the distribution of private valuations, the bigger the common component shared by buyers and sellers,
the smaller are the potential gains from trade when measured as a proportion of the average transaction
price.
Our deﬁnition of a transaction cost corresponds to the Marshallian concept of the expected loss in ag-
gregate social surplus from using this market mechanism instead of an optimal one. With the exception
of the loss from executed sell orders by high valuation traders, the upper and lower bounds are within ﬁve
percentage points of each other, allowing us to pin down the welfare losses in this market. Estimates of the
three types of expected losses sum to about 9 Kronors per order. An alternative deﬁnition of transaction
cost is the bid ask spread itself, which is commonly interpreted as a gauge of market liquidity because it is
the minimum cost of simultaneously placing market orders to buy and sell one unit from the existing limit
orders and reduce each side of the book by one unit while retaining an asset neutral position. Referring to
Table 2, the length of the bid ask spread is typically only one tick, which in our sample is 1 Kronor, except
for the brief time when the midquote dropped below 100 Kronors and the tick size halved. Our estimates of
social losses dwarf the bid ask spread, underlining in practice the difference between these two concepts of
transaction costs.
The lower bound on the realized gains from trade, 12.50 Kronors, is found by subtracting the upper
bounds to the three losses from the lower bound on the total social surplus available. We ﬁnd that the
32current limit order system achieves at least 57 percent of the potential gains from trade. Putting this another
way, aside from the gains that accrue to buyers with high valuations and sellers with low valuations placing
market orders, almost half the remaining social surplus is lost to transaction costs. Of the 43 percent, 12
percent of the unrealized surplus is due to canceled orders, approximately 13 percent of the losses are due
to executed buy orders and 18 percent come from executed sell orders. Within the context of our model,
the losses arise from differences between the individually optimal decision rule and the socially optimal
decision rule. This suggests that the private incentives in the market differ from those that implement the
socially optimal outcomes, or that the transaction costs associated with this market form are quite large.
More than two thirds of the welfare losses are caused by offers that eventually trade. In our model wrong
sided trades help the limit order book to re-center itself around the common value after a major shift in the
common value. The size of this loss is directly attributable to the relatively short time between submission
and execution indicated in Table 2, which implies almost all trading occurs between individuals who both
submit their orders within the same subsample, whereas our results show that within each subsample a
preponderance of the individual valuations are drawn from one side of the median or the other. For example,
it is evident from Figure 3 that in the fourth subsample almost all the private valuations are positive, yet
approximately 55 percent of the orders submitted are buy orders and 45 percent are sell orders.
6 Summary and Conclusion
This paper develops, estimates and tests a model of limit order markets, implementing it on the Stock-
holm Stock Exchange. Our theoretical framework incorporates both private and common components to
valuations in order to characterize the trade-off between placing orders closer to the bid ask spread, which
raises the execution probability, versus further apart, which secures better terms in the event of execution.
We allow common shocks to the value of the asset that expose limit orders to the winner’s curse. We de-
rive monotonicity conditions from the individual’s optimization problem which link private components of
valuations to the execution probabilities of the orders.
We also establish conditions for the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium whose outcomes satisfy
a mixing condition and evaluate its welfare properties relative to the social optimum. The strategic behavior
33predicted in equilibrium generates two forms of distortions. Buyers with low private valuations and sellers
with high valuations sometimes trade on the wrong side of the market to capitalize on unanticipated changes
in the common shock and thus bring about market corrections. In addition, agents placing limit orders risk
forfeiting the gains from trade in an endeavor to obtain a better price. These losses can be interpreted as
transaction costs of doing business in this market.
The model’s monotonicity, and uniform mixing properties along with a factor structure assumption
on the common value underlie the identiﬁcation of the probability distribution for private valuations from a
time series on the limit order book and a series of observed factors. Our semiparametric approach to estimat-
ing a linear index model adapts methods that were developed for identically and independently distributed
observations to our time series data. It applies to dependent data, in which a ﬁrst step is required to nonpara-
metrically estimate an expectations function. The estimates and test statistics from the structural estimation
are of interest in their own right, but also form the foundation for identifying bounds on the welfare gains
and losses in this market.
In our application, the common shock is a linear function of the stock market index, and the expectation
functions estimated in the ﬁrst step are used to form terms in the conditional winner’s curse and execution
probabilities. Thus the time dependence between observations stems from the stock market index, and
also from the evolution of the limit order book itself. As illustrated in our description of the data, both
expectation functions exhibit substantial variation depending on the state of the limit order book. When the
restrictions of the structural model are imposed in estimation, we ﬁnd the coefﬁcient on the stock market
index is positive and signiﬁcant. We can reject neither the overidentifying restrictions obtained from the
multiple equations that individually identify the linear index, nor the monotonicity tests which relate private
valuations to prices. Market participants apparently place their orders strategically, our results suggesting
that their choices reﬂect the trade-off between price, execution probability and the winner’s curse. Indeed
the estimates show that only about half of the social surplus from potential gains from trade are actually
realized by this market.
Our empirical work also reveal several features of the model that are not supported by the data. Two
types of misspeciﬁcation are documented. First, the linear index we estimate does not satisfy all the co-
34efﬁcient restrictions implied by the theory. Second, the plots of the identiﬁed portions of the probability
distribution of the private valuations are not monotone increasing everywhere, and also exhibit some evi-
dence of shifting over the duration of the sample.
One interpretation of the evidence against the model is that the probability distribution determining pri-
vate valuations is not identically and independently distributed, but depends on the state variables. This
interpretation calls into question the assumption that the trading opportunities are exogenous. Supposing
private valuations are indeed independently and identically distributed, but that the submission and with-
drawals of orders are endogenous. Under this interpretation only the truncated probability distribution of
those placing orders could be estimated and our theory shows that if participation is not universal, then the
probability of participation, and the truncated probability distribution of participants, depends on the state
variables. The fact that non-participants might be deterred from making a bid by the winner’s curse is one
component of welfare losses that our empirical analysis fails to identify.
A similar argument could be made if, as in our framework, everyone ﬁnds it optimal to place an order,
but in contrast to our setup, traders have the opportunity to withdraw limit orders and reposition their orders.
Lacking data on the identity of traders we are unable to estimate the effect of repositioning limit orders
in response to changes in the aggregate shocks. Incorporating this feature would affect the way the gains
from trade are computed. In this case, mistakenly attributing repositioned orders to nonexecution inﬂates
the estimate of welfare losses.
Incomplete information is a third factor neglected in our analysis that might affect the sensitivity of
our results, including the estimates of the welfare bounds. Here intuition might suggest that our welfare
estimates underestimate losses for two reasons. First, the private valuations of more informed traders are
partly due to advance notice about future common shocks rather than liquidity concerns arising from their
own savings and consumption plans, so should not be fully included the social surplus from trade. Second,
less informed traders, fearing exploitation by more informed traders through this additional source of a
winner’s curse, would reduce their participation in the market. Sand˚ as (1999) is a ﬁrst attempt to estimate a
structural model of adverse selection and private information from data on limit order markets.
But having acknowledged the potential sensitivity of our results to the simplifying assumptions about
35the information structure and the nature of market participation in our model, and also indicated directions
for future research, we nevertheless believe our work provides a useful benchmark.
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where the ﬁrst line follows because u
￿ ut, the second line follows from the optimality of choosing pi for
the agent with valuation ut and the third line follows because u
￿ ut. Therefore it is not optimal for an agent
with private valuation component u
￿ ut to set do
jt
￿ 1 for any j
￿ From these inequalities we deduce that if
the agent has a valuation u
￿ ut then the optimal strategy is to set djt
￿
￿





optimal for ut and djt
￿
￿











































Multiplying the second inequality by
￿
1












The proof for the buy side is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 2
Because the maximand on the right side of Equation (7) is decreasing in ut




￿ is too. By monotonicity result in Proposition 1, V s
t
￿ u
￿ is a convex decreasing function in ut, formed
from linear segments. All valuations ut lying on the same linear segment lead to the same optimal price
tick choice, and the slope of Vs
t
￿ u




is a piecewise convex increasing function in ut
￿ and an analogous interpretation applies. Since the absolute
value of the gradients of both value functions are bounded by one, they must intersect once, at the value












39Then the monotonicity result implies Vt
￿ u
￿















Then there exists an open interval
￿ ut
￿ ut

















Proof of Proposition 3
In the ﬁrst part of the proposition, respectively deﬁne pb
1t and ps
1t as the prices which solve Equations
(8) and (7) for Ut
￿ In the second part, deﬁne pb
1t as the price which solves Equation (8) for ut, and ps
1t as
the price which solves Equation (7) for ut
￿ The remaining parts of the proposition are direct implications of
Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 4



































demonstrates that choosing djt













t then by Proposition 2 vt
￿ pj which
































1 (iteratively) dominates choosing dit
￿
￿












￿ Noting the value of participating in






















































































￿ the result immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 6
Let rit denote the rank of a limit order at price pi and let nit denote the length of the pi limit order queue
at the beginning of the period. Denote by
￿H
￿ the dimension of H
￿ and
￿Z
￿ the dimension of Z
￿ Let Y be the













h R 2 to
 0
￿ 1



























￿ as the subjective probability of executing a sell order at price pi
when the book is in state ht, the factors driving the common shock is zt, and the limit order is ranking ri in







￿ Similarly let X be the space of











































































To prove the proposition, we establish that the decision rules computed using these subjective beliefs satisfy
the requirements of a Markov perfect equilibrium.






h X to compute the indifference valuations for




































































￿ as the corresponding set for sellers. Having
computed the indifference valuations for all pi and pj in P
￿ the iterative strategy described in the text is used










The conditional choice probabilities characterize the population choices up to the private component

















￿ Then the conditional choice probability of placing a limit order to






































































































































￿ are continuous in f and g









































































































￿ are continuous in f and g
￿ Second, the algorithm for determining the
optimal choices from the set of indifference values is made by comparing a ﬁnite number of inequalities, an
operation that preserves continuity. Therefore the boundaries deﬁning the sets which delineate the choices













composite functions, formed from applying differences in G to values taken the boundaries of the sets de-
scribed above. Our assumption that G is differentiable, implies G is continuous. Finally, noting composition












￿ are continuous in f and g is justiﬁed.







￿ the executions generated by a stationary decision rule
of this form converge in distribution to a stationary probability distribution at a geometric rate. The proof of
this result is based on a recursion involving the transition of the execution probabilities. At its heart is the





￿ to form their indifference valuations.















































































is the probability that a market order for price pi will cancel the leading limit order expected over next















￿ is continuous in f and g











in f and g







h X as the basis for determining the indifference valuations to implement the decision










































































The ﬁrst expression on the right side of Deﬁnition (A2) is the probability of executing next period, while the




















￿ is continuous in f and g









































































￿ is also continuous for all ﬁnite N
￿ To prove this property which we





￿ is continuous in f and g




































































































































































￿ is continuous, Expression (A3) is bounded above by any e







￿ maps Y into itself, and the composition operator preserves con-
tinuity. Furthermore Expression (A4) is similarly bounded because G1
￿ f
￿ g
￿ is continuous in f and g, as
established above. Appealing to the induction principle establishes the claim at the beginning of the para-
graph.
44The monotonicity of G1
￿ f
￿ g














































































































































































￿ satisﬁes Blackwell’s conditions, and is therefore a contraction. We









Following a similar proof strategy to above, we develop a recursive representation for the expected
change in the common value conditional on execution for all existing limit orders in the book. Given a





















































































































￿ the ﬁrst expression on the right side of Equation (A5) is
the contribution to the winner’s curse from executing next period, the second expression arises from the one
period change in yt that affects any gain from trade if the limit order is executed after the next period, and
the third term is the expected winner’s curse term as computed with next period’s state variables.




￿ one can show that G2
￿ f
￿ g
￿ is continuous in f and g
￿ preserves monotonicity,







￿ denote the unique


























































￿ . The last step of the proof is to show that the conditions for Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem are
satisﬁed, which together with remarks at the outset of the proof establish the existence of a Markov perfect
equilibrium and thus complete the proof.
To showY has a ﬁxed point, we ﬁrst note that by construction Y
h X is nonempty, convex and complete.
Furthermore Y
h X is totally bounded, and thus we conclude that Y
h X is compact. This only leaves the


















































































































































































































Accordingly for any e
￿ 0







































































































￿ is proved the same
way.














































Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is based on four properties of our model:
1. Let Z denote the support of zt,U the support of ut
￿ and H the support of ht
￿ The probability of the book



































1 denote the complement of Z1 in Z. Condition M of Stokey and Lucas (1989, page 346) is
satisﬁed by the exogenous stochastic process zt if there exists e1





















￿ is bounded above, one
can show zt satisﬁes Condition M.
3. Similarly since ut is independent, it trivially satisﬁes Condition M.






























￿ as well, by exploiting the
four properties described above. More speciﬁcally we show there exists some e
















































































￿ e1 for all z




￿ Then by the ﬁrst property there exists some
l






































￿ 0 for any e




























































￿ 0 for any e








￿ e1 for all z





1 for Z1 in the discussion
above, and repeating the arguments presented there establishes the existence of an e





































￿ H and H1
# H
￿




￿ e1 for all z











￿ e1 for all z






As in the second case, the analysis of the last two cases follow the ﬁrst case, after making the appro-
priate substitutions. Therefore Condition M is satisﬁed, and consequently Theorem 11.12 on page 348 of
Stokey and Lucas (1989) applies. This implies that the process is uniformly mixing with uniform mixing
coefﬁcients converging to zero at a geometric rate.
B Asymptotic Properties of Estimators
This appendix derives the asymptotic results we use in the discussion of our empirical results. First we
provide the assumptions required to establish the asymptotic properties of our estimators and test statistics;
48then we establish the propositions used in the text. The third part of this appendix provides details about the
implementation of the nonparametric estimators.
B.1 Ancillary Assumptions
There are essentially two differences distinguishing the assumptions we make from those listed in Ahn
(1997). First we relax his assumption that the index variables are independently and identically distributed,
by assuming instead that the variables are uniform mixing. Second, we assume the intercept term on the
index is known, but relax the assumption that all the index variables are drawn from a convex subset; we
only require that one of the index variables has convex compact support.
A1 Uniform mixing: The data is generated by a process that satisﬁes a uniform mixing condition
for uniform mixing coefﬁcients that converge to zero at a geometric rate. Proposition 7 provides
conditions on the primitives of the model which ensure that outcomes from the model satisfy this
uniform mixing condition.
A2 Index variables:
1. At least one of the components in the L
￿ 1 dimensional vector of index variables, x jkt, has an
unconditional joint Lebesque density p. Let x denote the c dimensional subvector of x jkt with
this property, and assume the support of this variable is a convex subset of R c, with nonempty
interior X. The density p is continuous in this component, so that p
￿ x
￿
￿ 0 for all x
￿ ¶X, where













































￿ are continuously differentiable in all the components of x
￿ X, where
X differs from X by a set of measure 0.



























¶x x have ﬁnite unconditional second moments.











































































￿ are all N




￿ nd derivatives, where N is an integer satisfying N
￿ L
￿ 5
A5 Second stage kernel: The second stage kernel k2 : R c
> R 1 is bounded and symmetric about zero.








￿ 0 for all x
￿ ¶X.



























































A6 Secondstage bandwidths: Thesecond stage bandwidth foreach index variable iisgiven byconstant
h
T



















A7 First stage variables:
1. Let o denote the joint density function of w, the conditioning variables used in the ﬁrst stage







2. The function x, which gives the index variables as functions of the winner’s curse function and
conditional execution probabilities, is continuously differentiable, with bounded second deriva-








































































































is the vector of conditional expectation estimated in the ﬁrst stage kernel regression conditional
on choice i, with gb
s
￿ w



















￿ are D times differentiable











￿ k2, where Q is the
number of conditioning variables used in the ﬁrst stage kernel estimates and k2 is the exponent
in the second stage bandwidth, deﬁned in assumption A6.
4. The variables predicted in the ﬁrst stage kernel estimates, y all have bounded support.
A8 First stage kernel: The ﬁrst stage kernel function, k1 : R Q
> R 1 is bounded and symmetric about



















where C and g are positive constants less than ¥.
























































A9 Firststage bandwidth: Theﬁrststage bandwidth foreach conditioning variable iisgiven byconstant
h
T
























































￿ 0 and c
￿ ¥.
51B.2 Estimating the Index Coefﬁcients
Proposition 8 below, and its supporting Lemmas borrow heavily from Powell, Stock and Stoker (1989),
Ahn (1997), Denker and Keller (1983) and Robinson (1989). Let M b








￿ Xb. The process
￿
xt




























Lemma 1 provides a preliminary result about U–statistics and its projection for absolutely regular processes
with sample dependent kernels. Then, we establish the asymptotic properties of ˆ fk
j, while Lemma 2 shows
how to form a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix. Finally, Lemma 3 provides the asymptotic
distribution of the statistics used in the test of monotonicity.
































































































































































































































































and Ge is a constant that does not depend on the kernel. As Robinson (1989) remarks, the proof of this
proposition also extends to kernels that depend on the sample size T. Therefore, Equation (B12) implies
















The Chebyshev inequality now implies implies (B11). Equation (B10) then follows by applying the Ergodic
theorem to ˆ UT.





























































































is the vector of the forecast errors in the ﬁrst stage conditional expectation, a
￿P
￿
￿ 1 vector. Deﬁne the























































Proof: By Proposition 6, A1 implies that the outcomes of our model are uniformly strong mixing, with





￿ , then b
￿ T
￿ also satisﬁes a
geometric bound. Thus, Lemma 1 applies to our data. The ﬁrst part of the proposition then follows from
applying Lemma 1 in place of Ahn’s (1997) Lemma B.1 in the proof of Ahn’s (1997) Lemma 2, using a
similar technique to Robinson (1989), equation (7.10) to show that the kernel has the correct convergence
rate, noting that by Collomb and H¨ ardle (1986), Ahn’s Lemmas C.1 and C.2 hold under our assumptions,
and by applying Lemma 1 in approximating (C.24) of Ahn (1997) by its projection. Asymptotic normality
follows since the process
￿
ht
￿ satisﬁes the requirements of Theorem 5.1.2, page 129 of Zhengyan and
Chuanrong (1996).
The next Lemma demonstrates shows how we form a consistent estimator of CT.




























































































Here, LL is a lag length, satisfying the condition that LL
> ¥ as T




formed from the ﬁrst and second stage kernel estimates of the quantities in Equation (B1) as in Ahn (1997),
Equation (3.13), page and ˆ µs
j
5 ik is are formed from third stage kernel regressions, as in Equations (3.14)
and (3.15) in Ahn (1997) and ˆ Ji
￿ wt








54Proof: The follows from applying the arguments on pages 531-533 of Robinson (1989) to the estimator.
B.3 Testing the Monotonicity Conditions
















































￿ Recalling the deﬁnition of ˆ m
q
ijkl, we





































































































Applying Theorem 5.1.2, page 129 ofZhengyan and Chuanrong (1996) to Equation (B23) and combining










* has an asymptotic normal distribution, since it
is a combination of asymptotic normal random variables.
The asymptotic covariance matrix is computed in the same manner as in Lemma 2.
C Implementing the Nonparametrics
This appendix provides supplementary detail about the nonparametric estimation. As explained in the text,
there are three places where nonparametric estimation is undertaken. First we estimate the conditional exe-
cution probabilities and terms that make up the conditional winner’s curse risk function using ﬁrst stage ker-
nel regressions. Second, the average derivative estimators require another round of kernel regression, where
the conditioning variables are formed with estimates calculated using the ﬁrst stage kernel regressions. The
third place nonparametric techniques are used is in estimating the asymptotic variance–covariance matrix,
55where the conditional choice probabilities for each choice are estimated, along with the conditional expec-
tation of the derivative of the index variables with respect to the conditional expectations estimated in the
ﬁrst stage. In addition the approximation of the inﬁnite sum with a ﬁnite one adds another dimension to the
time series nature of the problem. We used standard multidimensional product Gaussian kernels for all the
nonparametric estimation. Details about the bandwidth choices and trimming procedures are as follows.
First Stage
￿
Bandwidths: Assumption A9, the ﬁrst stage bandwidth for conditioning each variable l is given by
slT





















￿ , where D is the order of differentiability of the density
of the conditioning variables in the ﬁrst stage kernel estimates, the conditional expectation functions
estimated in the ﬁrst stage kernel regressions and the expected derivative of r with respect to the ﬁrst
stage conditional expectations, ˆ Ji
￿ wt
￿ Here, k2 is the exponent in the second stage bandwidth, to be
given below. In our application k1
￿ 1
3 120 satisﬁes the required conditions.
￿










￿ where ¯ X are the sample means and ˆ S is the sample covariance matrix.
We trimmed 10 percent of the observations from the sample based on the values of the conditioning
variables, which reduced our sample size to 19,952.
Second Stage
￿
Bandwidth: Following assumption A6 the second stage bandwidth for each index variable i is given
by siT






















￿ , the expected trimming indicator, r
￿ mjt
￿ , and the conditional expected value of the
decision indicator, F
￿ mjt
￿ . In our application k2
￿ 1
3 9 satisﬁes the required conditions.
￿
Trimming: We trimmed a further 5 percent of the observations from the trimmed sample used in the




Bandwidth We used the same bandwidth as in the second stage.
￿
Trimming We used the same trimming as in the second stage, leaving us with 18,954 observations.
￿
Lag Length In implementing the estimator of the asymptotic variance covariance matrix, we set the
lag length, LL equal to 10.
57Table 1: Price and Volume
Average Std.Dev Min Max
Closing price (Kronor) 110.720 9.314 87.50 127.50
Daily return (percent) 0.18 3.66 -10.82 12.89
Daily volume (Millions of Kronor) 74.43 37.08 20.26 215.30
Number of orders 376 151 137 768
Number of limit orders 214 79 80 417
Number of market orders 161 75 57 374
This table reports summary statistics on price and volume for Ericsson over the period Dec 3, 1991 through
March 2, 1992. There are 59 trading days in the sample.
Table 2: Order Flow
Buy Orders Sell Orders
Ticks from ask quote Ticks from bid quote
3+ 2 1 market 3+ 2 1 market
Total number 934 1039 4407 6422 598 879 3392 4457
of orders
Order size 1.50 2.98 2.53 1.84 2.38 3.72 3.65 2.69
1000 shares (0.105) (0.138) (0.057) (0.045) (0.364) (0.153) (0.103) (0.066)
Unconditional 0.196 0.363 0.696 1.000 0.187 0.332 0.673 1.000
execution prob. (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
Time to 273.6 108.7 32.4 271.1 257.9 111.2
execution (min.) (18.962) (4.557) (2.311) (11.675) (54.260) (69.894)
This table presents summary statistics on the order ﬂow for Ericsson from Dec 3, 1991 through March
2, 1992. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 22,128 order submissions used in the
calculations.
58Table 3: Limit Order Book
Quote Order quantity at quote: 1000’s of Shares Ticks from midquote
Average Median Std.Dev. Average Median Std.Dev
3rd Ask 16.82 10.20 17.50 2.43 2.50 0.60
2nd Ask 26.16 21.40 20.51 1.43 1.50 0.33
1st Ask 20.22 14.70 19.69 0.48 0.50 0.14
1st Bid 18.52 14.10 17.40 -0.48 -0.50 0.14
2nd Bid 24.42 19.20 21.87 -1.40 -1.50 0.32
3rd Bid 16.63 11.40 18.91 -2.35 -2.50 0.80
This table reports information on the order book in Ericsson from Dec 3, 1991 through March 2, 1992. The
limit order book is computed each time an order is submitted, and there are 22,128 order submissions over
the period. The mid–quote is the average of best ask and best bid prices at the time of order submission.
Third best bid quote refers to the third highest price with outstanding limit buy orders.
59Table 4: Order Execution Probabilities
Conditioning Value Execution probability
variable Limit Buys Limit sells
Ticks from best quote Ticks from best quote
3+ 2 1 3+ 2 1
Time Low 0.214 0.403 0.743 0.229 0.383 0.709
of day High 0.173 0.310 0.649 0.127 0.260 0.649
c2
￿ 1
￿ 2.420 9.419 45.364 9.827 14.279 14.646
p–value (0.1100) (0.0024) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Market Volatility High 0.213 0.351 0.706 0.185 0.328 0.698
Low 0.183 0.374 0.698 0.189 0.337 0.662
c2
￿ 1
￿ 1.361 0.559 0.353 0.015 0.074 5.073
p-value (0.2434) (0.4547) (0.5524) (0.9025) (0.7856) (0.0243)
Trading Volume High 0.181 0.374 0.687 0.189 0.333 0.650
Low 0.221 0.353 0.716 0.186 0.333 0.704
c2
￿ 1
￿ 2.242 0.485 4.384 0.008 0.000 11.279
p-value (0.1343) (0.4862) (0.0363) (0.9287) (1.0000) (0.0008)
Order size Low 0.222 0.459 0.744 0.1844 0.3304 0.7500
High 0.151 0.309 0.662 0.1899 0.3338 0.6489
c2
￿ 1
￿ 7.097 23.303 34.733 0.029 0.005 35.289
p–value (0.0076) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8640) (0.9239) (0.0000)
Ask quantity: Low 0.206 0.383 0.639 0.2460 0.3581 0.7641
Best quote High 0.185 0.344 0.725 0.1228 0.2929 0.5521
c2
￿ 1
￿ 0.633 1.678 34.483 14.875 3.823 172.257
p–value (0.3999) (0.1856) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0462) (0.0000)
Bid quantity: Low 0.166 0.401 0.768 0.2117 0.3754 0.6141
Best quote High 0.241 0.293 0.579 0.1667 0.3038 0.7129
c2
￿ 1
￿ 7.915 11.861 175.104 1.976 4.613 35.518
p–value (0.0056) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.1598) (0.0273) (0.0000)
Bid–ask Low 0.294 0.455 0.767 0.4364 0.3810 0.7546
spread High 0.168 0.348 0.687 0.1621 0.3264 0.6690
c2
￿ 1
￿ 15.972 6.031 13.541 24.687 0.952 9.328
p–value (0.0001) (0.0105) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.2660) (0.0007)
This table reports estimates of the execution probabilities conditional on different variables. We condition
on whether the conditioning variables are above (High) or below (Low) their medians. The third row for
each variable reports the chi-squared statistic for a test of independence, with 1 degree of freedom, with the
asymptotic p–value reported in parentheses below. There are 22,128 observations.
60Table 5: Choice Probabilities
Conditioning Value Choice probability c2
￿ 7
￿
variable Buy orders Sell orders
Ticks from best quote Ticks from best quote
3+ 2 1 market 3+ 2 1 market
Time Low 0.048 0.053 0.200 0.268 0.032 0.047 0.154 0.198 126.93
of day High 0.037 0.041 0.198 0.313 0.022 0.032 0.153 0.205 (.0000)
Market Low 0.038 0.038 0.200 0.316 0.023 0.033 0.145 0.208 135.297
volatility High 0.046 0.055 0.196 0.269 0.031 0.046 0.159 0.198 (.0000)
Trading Low 0.052 0.052 0.191 0.308 0.026 0.036 0.142 0.192 122.165
volume High 0.032 0.041 0.205 0.276 0.028 0.043 0.161 0.213 (.0000)
Order size Low 0.059 0.038 0.185 0.369 0.028 0.022 0.100 0.199 1035.54
High 0.028 0.055 0.211 0.226 0.026 0.054 0.197 0.203 (.0000)
Ask Low 0.045 0.046 0.132 0.414 0.028 0.049 0.183 0.101 2925.56
quantity High 0.039 0.048 0.265 0.167 0.026 0.030 0.123 0.300 (.0000)
Bid Low 0.051 0.061 0.249 0.162 0.025 0.033 0.107 0.314 3375.35
quantity High 0.034 0.033 0.150 0.418 0.029 0.047 0.200 0.090 (.0000)
Bid-ask Low 0.059 0.038 0.156 0.366 0.016 0.021 0.111 0.234 271.93
spread High 0.039 0.049 0.207 0.277 0.029 0.043 0.161 0.196 (.0000)
This table reports the empirical choice probabilities conditional on different conditioning variables. We
condition on whether the conditioning variables are above (High) or below (Low) their medians. The last
column reports the chi-squared statistic for a test of independence. The test has 7 degrees of freedom and
the asymptotic p-value is report below the statistic. There are 22,128 observations.
61Table 6: Index Model Estimates
Choice Equation Coefﬁcient Estimate Standard Error t statistic
Single Equation Estimates
Limit sell +1 tick scale














Limit sell +2 ticks scale














Limit buy -1 tick scale


























































Market factor 0.378 0.097 3.894
Chi squared statistic 0.0213 (3 df) p–value (1.0000)
This table reports the results of estimating the theoretical model using the market index as the factor. The
ﬁrst panel report the results of estimating the model for separate choices, and the second panel reports the
minimum distance estimates. The ﬁnal column provides the asymptotic t-statistics for each coefﬁcient.
The chi-squared statistic refers to the minimized value of the minimum distance criterion function, and the
asymptotic p–value is reported in parenthesis.
62Table 7: Monotonicity Tests
Instrument Threshold Differences
1 tick sell 2 tick sell 2 tick buy All choices
- 2 tick sell - 2 tick buy - 1 tick buy
Constant 2.4980 -0.6024 0.8061 0.0001
(0.9996) (0.3943) (0.7457) (1.0000)
￿order price - midquote
￿ 1.8919 -0.6658 1.0122 0.0003
(0.9925) (0.3464) (0.8477) (1.0000)
Order quantity 0.9718 -0.7680 0.6471 0.0001
(0.8307) (0.2775) (0.6399) (1.0000)
Fast trading (
￿ 10 sec) 1.2077 -0.5913 0.9022 0.0003
(0.9123) (0.4030) (0.7980) (1.0000)
Slow trading (
￿ 240 sec) 0.7546 -0.4111 0.4881 0.0001
(0.7141) (0.5610) (0.5100) (1.0000)
Tick
￿ 1 Kronor 0.5817 -0.6484 0.9774 0.0001
(0.5893) (0.3591) (0.8331) (1.0000)
Absolute price change 1.7248 -0.4017 0.6038 0.0006
last 30 minutes (0.9853) (0.5700) (0.6069) (1.0000)
Trading volume 3.1947 0.8378 1.1227 0.0013
last 30 minutes (1.0000) (0.2361) (0.8877) (1.0000)
Cumulative orders 1.6060 -0.5692 0.8402 0.0008
sell side (0.9769) (0.4208) (0.7652) (1.0000)
Cumulative orders 3.3665 -0.7193 0.7947 0.0013
buy side (1.0000) (0.3090) (0.7389) (1.0000)
Depth 2.7311 -0.4768 0.5713 0.001
sell side (0.9999) (0.5001) (0.5809) (1.0000)
Depth 0.9923 -0.5350 1.0390 0.0004
buy side (0.8395) (0.4493) (0.8583) (1.0000)
All (M value) 0.0021 0.0025 0.0014 0.1245
p–value (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000)
This table reports the monotonicity tests our our model. We calculate the average of the absolute value
of the instrument times differences in the thresholds for different choices. We report individual one–sided
t–statistics for each choice, and the joint monotonicity test for each instrument. The asymptotic p–values are
given below the statistic. For the joint test, the p–values are computed using the simulation method given in
Wolak (1989).
63Table 8: Functional Form Tests
Equation Coefﬁcient Estimate t statistic























Common value=winner’s curse c2
￿ 1
￿ 117.300 (0.0000)































Common value=winner’s curse c2
￿ 1
￿ 0.0001 (0.9920)































Common value=winner’s curse c2
￿ 1
￿ 4.806 (0.0284)























Common value=winner’s curse c2
￿ 1
￿ 72.160 (0.0000)
All equations Price=shading c2
￿ 4
￿ 82.983 (0.0000)






Winner’s curse unimportant c2
￿ 1
￿ 94.634 (0.0000)
This table reports estimates from applying an average derivative estimator to the model in Equation (39).
This model nests our theoretical model. We report asymptotic chi–squared statistics for the null hypothesis
that the restrictions of the theoretical model are true. Asymptotic p–values are reported in parentheses.
64Table 9: Tests for extra factors
Choice equation Variable Estimate t statistic Estimate t statistic
Panel A
Time-of-the-day Time-between-orders































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 59.122 (0.0000) 58.722 (0.0000)







































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 6.999 (0.0302) 2.369 (0.3059)































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 15.714 (0.0004) 5.371 (0.0.0682)



























trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 51.668 (0.0000) 56.066 (0.0000)
All choices trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 8
￿ 32.002 (0.0001) 25.726 (0.0012)
Panel B
Bid–quantity Ask–quantity































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 48.629 (0.0000) 27.024 (0.0000)







































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 15.635 (0.0004) 7.781 (0.0204)

































￿ = 0 13.415 (0.0012) 16.088 (0.0003)































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 20.452 (0.0000) 28.410 (0.0000)
All choices trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 8
￿ 25.380 (0.0013) 19.643 (0.0118)
This table reports estimates of the index model augmented by additional factors, Equation (40) in the text.
The row marked c2
￿ 2
￿ : trade-off = 0 provides an asymptotic chi–squared test of the null hypothesis that the
coefﬁcients on the variables in the theoretical model are all equal to zero. Asymptotic p–values are given in
parentheses. 65Table 9: Tests for extra factors (continued)
Choice equation Variable Estimate t statistic Estimate t-statistic
Panel C
Bid-ask spread mid-quote































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 63.163 (0.0000) 71.378 (0.0000)



































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 11.595 (0.0030) 6.818 (0.0331)































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 6.210 (0.0488) 14.975 0.0006)



































trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 50.392 (0.000) 59.303 (0.000)
All equations trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 8
￿ 29.011 (0.0003) 48.232 (0.0000)
Panel D
Extra Factor Market Factor



















trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 63.526 (0.0000)























trade-off = 0 11.407 (0.0033)



















trade-off = 0 20.148 (0.0000)






















All equations trade-off = 0 c2
￿ 2
￿ 39.172 (0.0000)
This table reports estimates of the index model augmented by additional factors, Equation (40) in the text.
The row marked c2
￿ 2
￿ : trade-off = 0 provides an asymptotic chi–squared test of the null hypothesis that the
coefﬁcients on the variables in the theoretical model are all equal to zero. Asymptotic p–values are given in
parentheses. 66Table 10: Welfare Calculations
Panel A
Upper bound Lower bound
Theoretical gains from trade ———- 21.82
Loss from cancellations 2.59 2.50
Loss from executed buy orders 3.03 3.07
Loss from executed sell orders 4.06 3.85
Lower bound on realized gains from trade 12.50
Panel B
As a percentage of lower bound of theoretical gains from trade
Upper bound on loss from cancellations 11.87
Upper bound on loss from executed buy orders 13.89
Upper bound on loss from executed sell orders 18.61
Lower bound on realized gains from trade 57.23
This table presents our estimates of the realized and theoretical gains from trade. Panel A provides the gains
and losses in units of Swedish Kronor. The average price of Ericsson is approximately 110 over our sample
period. The columns marked Lower Bounds provide the lower bounds, similarly for the columns marked
Upper Bounds. We only estimate a lower bound for the maximal social surplus. The lower bound on the
realized gains from trade is computed by subtracting the upper bound for the losses from the lower bound of
the theoretical gains from trade. Panel B reports the lower bounds on losses and upper bounds on realized
gains from trade as a percentage of the lower bound on the theoretical gains from trade. We use 16,076
observations in the calculations.
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Figure 1: Common value and mid-quote. This ﬁgure plots estimates of the common value (- - -) and the
mid-quote (—). The common value is computed using our minimum distance estimator. We divide the data
into 6 sub–periods of 2 weeks in length.
















Figure 2: Estimated Private ValueDistribution This ﬁgure plots estimates of the private value distribution.
Here the CDF is obtained through a nonparametric regression of the cumulative choices on our estimates of
the threshold private values, ˆ x
Wjkt ˆ bMD.








































































Figure 3: Sub–period private value distribution estimates This ﬁgure plots sub–period estimates of the
private value distribution for the same 6 sub-periods of 2 weeks in length as plotted in Figure 1. Here, the
CDFs are obtained through a nonparametric regression of the cumulative choices on our estimates of the
threshold private values, ˆ x
Wjkt ˆ bMD.
70